In this study, we examine the governance role and stability of promoters and institutional investors on IFRS value relevance and stock price crash risk. First, we examine how promoters switch between alignment and entrenchment and thereby shape the value relevance impact of IFRS convergence and find that promoters affect the ability of IFRS to improve value relevance non-monotonically. We also find that monitoring incentives rest with active investors and not passive investors. Next, we investigate the impact of institutional investors on stock price crash risk in India. Panel regression findings reveal that higher levels of FII holdings, signifying positional trading, exacerbate crash risk. Conversely, increased stability of FII holdings, indicative of active monitoring, diminishes crash risk. Notably, FIIs’ buying interest does not influence crash risk, affirming that their risk mitigation arises from active monitoring and not from curbing selling pressure. Lastly, to further illustrate the stability role of large shareholders in influencing crash risk, we investigate the role of institutional investors on crash risk in pledging firms where the margin call pressure destabilizes the promoter holdings. Panel regression analysis with a dataset of Indian companies demonstrates that institutional investors reduce pledging risk by supporting stock prices and reducing selling pressure. Further analysis reveals that this price support is provided by domestic institutional investors and is effective only in standalone pledging firm...