Queues are omnipresent especially in physical service systems serving human customers. In recent times, the focus in service operations management has shifted to managing service systems in the presence of strategic customers. Specifically, the notion of customers learning the service rate or the service quality from the length of the queue and other factors before making strategic decisions in varied environments has been studied. We present three essays based on queueing systems with strategic learning customers: (1) A queueing game theoretic analysis to manage capacitated non-customer-intensive service systems with impatient and patient customers, (2) A field study at primary care departments to identify the factors influencing the learning of strategic patients, and (3) A queueing game theoretic approach to manage non-emergency primary care systems with patients inferring quality from queue length and making strategic follow-up visit decisions. For non-customer-intensive services with impatient and patient customers, we develop a symmetric game among the impatient customers and suggest that the service provider should not always increase the waiting area capacity even if the objective is to minimize the blocking of customers. For non-emergency primary care services, we prescribe service rate strategies using a queueing game theoretic approach and show that it is not always incorrect to build up queues by slowing down as the queue influences the perceived quality.